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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gerald A. Barcella appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual background and course of the criminal proceedings are set 
forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 194-196, 
16 P.3d 288, 291-293 (Ct. App. 2000) (footnote omitted): 
The state's evidence at trial set forth the following fact 
scenario: On the evening of April 2, 1995, Barcella told Kenneth 
Thrift - his drinking buddy for the evening, Virginia Smeltzer - the 
bartender at the Watering Hole bar in Coeur d'Alene, and Brad 
Bakie that he intended to kill Smith, the elderly manager of the 
Harmony House apartments where Barcella resided. 
Returning to Barcella's room at the Harmony House 
apartments after the Watering Hole closed, Barcella and Thrift 
noisily entered the building and went into Barcella's one-room 
apartment, across the hall from Smith's room. There, they 
continued to drink accompanied by the noise of the radio and 
television. Smith, through the door, told Barcella to turn the volume 
down. Barcella begrudgingly complied. Some time later, while Thrift 
returned to his room next door to get some cigarettes and more 
beer, Barcella entered Smith's room and bludgeoned him in the 
head with a pulaski. When Thrift came back, about five minutes 
later, Barcella was at Smith's door, across the hall, wiping off the 
doorknob with his bandana. 
Back in Barcella's room, Barcella told Thrift that he had killed 
Smith. The two continued drinking beer until about 4:30 a.m. and 
then left to get breakfast at Denny's Restaurant. From there, 
Barcella called his girlfriend Rikki Bobo. He told her to get over to 
Denny's and that he had killed Smith. Once she arrived, Barcella 
again told Bobo and Thrift that he killed Smith by striking him in the 
head three times with a pick ax. 
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After visiting with Barcella and Thrift at Denny's for nearly an 
hour, Bobo returned to Barcella's room at Harmony House. There, 
she noticed that Barcella's pulaski was not in his room. When 
Barcella arrived, Bobo, with Barcella's approval, wrote out a note 
addressed to Smith requesting a receipt for Barcella's rent 
payment. Barcella told her that the note was a good idea because it 
would make the police believe that Barcella thought Smith was still 
alive. Bobo slipped the note under Smith's door. 
Later that afternoon, Peter Cooper, the owner of the 
Harmony House apartments, discovered Smith's body. Smith had 
several large head wounds and smaller wounds in his chest. A 
pulaski was found under a piece of carpet stuffed under Smith's 
bed. During the homicide investigation, officers discovered that 
Barcella, a convicted felon, possessed firearms in his room. While 
in jail on a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 
Barcella was charged with first degree murder for the killing of 
Smith, I.C. §§ 18-4001-18-4003. 
At the preliminary hearing, Robert Agrifolio, a convicted 
defendant in an unrelated burglary case, testified that in September 
of 1995 he occupied a jail cell adjacent to Barcella's cell in the 
Latah County Jail. After identifying Barcella, Agrifolio testified that, 
while in the jail's recreation yard, Barcella told him he hit Smith in 
the head with an ax because he believed Smith had killed his 
puppy. Agrifolio was cross-examined extensively about his prior 
convictions, his conversations with Barcella, and his reason for 
testifying. Agrifolio testified that he was under subpoena and denied 
being a jailhouse snitch or getting any benefit from testifying 
against Barcella. 
Barcella was bound over to district court for trial on the 
charge of murder in the first degree. At trial, the state called twenty-
two witnesses including investigating officers, medical experts, the 
Watering Hole bartender, the apartment owner, several apartment 
residents, Bobo, Thrift and two jailhouse informants - Agrifolio and 
George Lane. 
Before calling Thrift, the state attempted to preclude 
impeachment through Thrift's prior criminal convictions. In part, 
Barcella sought to impeach Thrift by introducing evidence of his 
criminal history, arguing that Thrift is per se untruthful because 
honest people do not get arrested ninety-four times, forty-two of 
which were for felonies. The trial court ruled that Thrift's only felony 
convictions in the last ten years were two DUls, not crimes relevant 
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to truth and veracity under I.R.E. 609. Thrift testified that Barcella 
owned a pulaski when he moved into the Harmony House 
apartments, that Barcella had several times threatened to kill Smith, 
and that he had seen Barcella wiping off Smith's doorknob with a 
bandana when Thrift came out of his room with more beer. Thrift 
also stated that Barcella admitted to killing Smith once he and Thrift 
returned to Barcella's room to drink more beer and, again, after he 
and Thrift arrived at Denny's Restaurant for breakfast early the next 
morning. 
Bobo also testified that Barcella owned a pulaski when he 
moved into the Harmony House apartments. She further testified to 
Barcella's admissions to killing Smith and acknowledged that she 
had written a note about rent payment that was slipped under 
Smith's door to prevent police attention from focusing on Barcella. 
After challenging Bobo's credibility by questioning her about a plea 
deal on a recent DUI charge and the state's grant of immunity 
regarding her writing the rent payment note, Barcella also sought to 
inquire about her status as a jail inmate and why she was allowed 
to testify in civilian clothing and makeup. The court sustained the 
state's objection to this line of inquiry. 
The state then attempted to call Agrifolio as its next witness; 
however, the bailiff reported that Agrifolio had told the jailers that he 
refused to testify. Agrifolio was brought into court from the jail and 
questioned. After he indicated that he did not want to testify, the 
court appointed counsel for Agrifolio so that he could obtain legal 
advice before finally deciding whether or not to testify. A day later, 
Agrifolio's counsel informed the court that Agrifolio would not testify. 
The district court determined that Agrifolio was unavailable. Four 
days later, the court, over Barcella's objection, permitted Agrifolio's 
preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record. 
The state's twentieth witness, Lane, also a jailhouse witness, 
testified that Barcella had admitted to killing his apartment manager 
by hitting him in the back of the head because the manager was 
nagging him about making too much noise. Lane testified that 
Barcella said a witness, his drinking buddy, had seen him come out 
of the manager's apartment on the night of the murder. Lane 
testified that Barcella was not worried about being prosecuted 
because in the past he had shot a couple of people and was never 
convicted. Barcella immediately objected and moved for a mistrial 
on the grounds that the state has elicited testimony about prior bad 
acts in violation of 1.R.E. 404. The district court denied the motion 
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for a mistrial and instructed the jury to disregard Lane's last 
statement. 
Barcella also sought a mistrial on the ground that the state 
made a late disclosure of the first twenty-seven pages of the 
transcript of Bobo's statement to the police. The court denied the 
motion, suggesting Barcella could avoid any prejudice caused by 
late disclosure by recalling Bobo as a witness. Barcella declined to 
do so. 
The trial court denied Barcella's motion for a judgment of 
acquittal made at the close of the state's case. During Barcella's 
case-in-chief, Barcella did not testify. After presenting several 
character witnesses in defense, Barcella sought to introduce 
testimony from Kootenai County Public Defender's Office 
Investigator Mark Durant. Durant was to testify that Agrifolio had 
recently made several unsolicited telephone calls to him, stating 
that he - Agrifolio - had been pressured into testifying at the 
preliminary hearing and, that when asked if his preliminary hearing 
testimony had been truthful, Agrifolio had said he would "take the 
Fifth Amendment on that." The state objected and the court, without 
explanation, disallowed Durant's testimony. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to first degree murder 
and found that Barcella had used a deadly weapon in the 
commission of the murder. Barcella filed a motion for new trial re-
raising the issues he had raised at trial - Lane's blurt about Barcella 
having shot two people in the past and gotten away with it, the late 
disclosure of the first twenty-seven pages of Bobo's statement to 
the police, the admission of Agrifolio's preliminary hearing 
testimony, the trial court's preclusion of Durant's impeachment of 
Agrifolio's preliminary hearing testimony, and the court's refusal to 
allow Barcella to inquire into Thrift's record of prior arrests to 
impeach him for lack of truthfulness. The district court denied 
Barcella's motion for a new trial, explaining that Barcella had failed 
to demonstrate prejudice from the state's late disclosure of a 
portion of Bobo's statement to the police and that Lane's "couple of 
shootings" blurt had been dealt with by instructing the jury to 
disregard that statement. The court also ruled that Agrifolio's 
purported refusal to testify made him unavailable, allowing his 
preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record, that I.RE. 
609 did not permit Barcella to impeach Thrift with his prior arrests, 
and that Barcella had made no offer of proof regarding 
impeachment of Agrifolio's preliminary hearing testimony. 
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The state filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, 
and a hearing was held on aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. The district court found that the state had failed to 
prove the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt and thus the death penalty could not be 
imposed. At sentencing, the district court imposed a term of life 
imprisonment, with thirty years fixed. The court denied Barcella's 
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of the sentence. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Barcella's conviction and sentence. 
Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 208. 
Course of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Barcella filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and 
supporting affidavits asserting 29 claims. 1 (#35502 R., Vol. I, pp.1-329; Vol. 11, 
pp.330-579.) The district court granted Barcella's request for counsel. (#35502 
R., Vol. I, p.2; Vol. Ill, pp.584-588.) Barcella's appointed counsel eventually 
narrowed and clarified Barcella's petition to include four claims: (1) the judgment 
and sentence were unconstitutional; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) his trial 
counsel was ineffective for preventing him from testifying and for failing to 
adequately communicate with him; and (4) his appellate counsel was ineffective. 
(#35502 R., Vol. Ill, pp.757-761; see also pp.778-786.) The state filed an answer 
and motion for summary disposition (#35502 R., Vol. Ill, pp.762-765). 
The district court summarily dismissed Barcella's first two claims and 
granted him an evidentiary hearing with regard to his ineffective assistance of 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court ordered that the appellate record in this case be 
augmented with the clerk's records and transcripts filed in Barcella's initial post-
conviction appeal, Barcella v. Idaho, Docket No. 35502. (1 /5/12 "Order 
Augmenting Record.") 
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trial and appellate counsel claims. (#35502 R., Vol. Ill, p.771; #35502 1/9/07 Tr., 
p.15, L.10 - p.20, L.3.) Following additional briefing from the parties (#35502 R., 
Vol. Ill, pp.778-819), and the two-day evidentiary hearing (#35502 5/29/07 Tr.; 
5/30/07 Tr.), the district court dismissed the remaining claims in Barcella's 
petition (#35502 R., Vol. Ill, pp.820-833). Concerning Barcella's ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim, the district court concluded that even if 
Barcella's counsel prevented him from testifying, Barcella failed to show 
prejudice. (#35502 R., Vol. Ill, pp.823-829.) 
Barcella appealed. (#35502 R., Vol. Ill, pp.840-843.) On appeal, Barcella 
argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claims. (#35502 Appellant's 
brief.) Barcella also argued that his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
preventing him from testifying should be analyzed both as an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and as a deprivation of a constitutional right claim. 
(#35502 Supplemental Appellant's brief.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court's dismissal of Barcella's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 224 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2009). The Court of 
Appeals first affirmed the district court's summary dismissal of Barcella's 
sentencing and prosecutorial misconduct claims. ~ at 474-476, 224 P.3d at 
541-543. The Court then held that Barcella did not raise a constitutional right 
deprivation claim in his post-conviction petition, and so it would not consider such 
a claim on appeal. kl at 475-477, 224 P.3d at 542-544. Finally, the Court 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Barcella's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. ~ at 477, 224 P.3d at 544-545. Specifically, the Court 
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concluded that Barcella "failed to demonstrate prejudice from any prevention by 
trial counsel of Barcella testifying at trial." kl 
While his appeal from the dismissal of his initial post-conviction petition 
was pending, Barcella filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, 
asserting that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify. (3/4/09 
"Verified Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief';2 R., pp.89-90.) The district 
court initially issued a notice of summary dismissal on the ground that Barcella 
had waived the claim by failing to pursue it previously. (R., pp.98-103; 119-129.) 
Barcella alleged in response that ineffective assistance of his initial post-
conviction counsel excused his failure to previously raise the claim. (R., pp.104-
118; 130-151.) The district court granted an evidentiary hearing and entertained 
additional briefing on both the claim and the issue of whether the claim had been 
waived. (R., p.269; 8/19/11 Tr.3) 
In its written memorandum opinion following the evidentiary hearing, the 
district court concluded that Barcella's initial post-conviction counsel's 
ineffectiveness constituted sufficient reason as to why the claim was not 
previously asserted. (R., pp.275-277.) However, the district court also 
concluded that Barcella failed to show that he was deprived of his constitutional 
right to testify. (R., pp.277-282.) The court further concluded that even if 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Barcella's motion to augment the appellate 
record with his 3/4/09 Verified Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
(4/25/12 Order). 
3 On July 12, 2012, Barcella filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
the transcript from the 8/19/11 evidentiary hearing. That motion remains pending 
before the Court. 
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Barcella had been so deprived of his constitutional right, such error was 
harmless. (R., pp.282-283.) Barcella timely appealed. (R., pp.286-292.) 
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ISSUE 
Barcella states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the District Court make an unreasonable determination 
of fact in finding that Mr. Barcella did not demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel denied him 
his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment and Idaho 
Constitution, Art. I, § 13 rights to testify at trial? 
2. Was the District Court's denial of post-conviction relief an 
unreasonable application of controlling United States 
Supreme Court precedent insofar as the Court refused to 
apply the required [Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1967)] harmless error analysis? 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Barcella failed to show the district court erred in dismissing his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing? 
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A 
ARGUMENT 
Barcella Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Dismissing His 
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief After An Evidentiary Hearing 
Introduction 
Barcella contends that the district court erred in dismissing his successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. (See generally. Appellant's brief.) Specifically, 
Barcella contends that the district court erred in concluding that Barcella waived 
his right to testify, and then by utilizing an incorrect harmless error standard. (Id.) 
A review of the record reveals that Barcella failed to meet his burden to show that 
he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify and that, while the district 
court utilized an incorrect harmless error standard, any error was harmless under 
the correct standard as well. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings 
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of 
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, 
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the 
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 
11 O (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has 
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not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 
Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. Barcella Has Failed To Meet His Burden To Show That His Right To 
Testify Was Violated 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. 
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). When a post-conviction 
petitioner alleges a direct violation of his or her constitutional right to testify, then 
the petitioner has the burden to show he or she was deprive of the right to testify. 
Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, _, 274 P.3d 1, 4-10 (Ct. App. 2012). 
A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to testify on his own behalf. 
State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 690, 778 P.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. 1989); Gootz 
v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 924 P.2d 622 (Ct. App. 1996). Counsel may advise the 
defendant regarding the wisdom and propriety of testifying; however, the 
defendant is personally vested with the ultimate authority to decide whether or 
not to testify. Hoffman, 116 Idaho at 690, 778 P.2d at 812. A defendant must be 
aware of his right to testify at trial before he can adequately waive that right. 
Hoffman, 116 Idaho at 691-92, 778 P.2d at 813-14; Gootz 129 Idaho 360, 924 
P.2d 622. 
However, neither Hoffman nor Gootz stand for the proposition that where 
a post-conviction petitioner asserts that he was deprived his constitutional right to 
testify, the district court is required to affirmatively find that the petitioner waived 
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his right to testify, and that the petitioner was aware of that right, before it may 
dismiss the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Rossignol 152 Idaho at _, 
274 P.3d at 4-11 (affirming district court's dismissal of a post-conviction petition 
after an evidentiary hearing where Rossignol failed to prove he was unaware of 
his ultimate right to decide whether to testify). Further, a district court is not 
required to obtain an on-the-record waiver of the right to testify when a defendant 
does not testify at trial. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 763, 760 P .2d 117 4, 
1179 (1988). In order to obtain relief, it is the post-conviction petitioner's burden 
to show that he was prevented from testifying and/or that he was unaware of his 
right to testify. 
In this case, the district court concluded that Barcella's counsel did advise 
him of his right to testify, and that Barcella waived that right. (R., pp.280-282.) 
On appeal, Barcella contends that these findings were erroneous. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.22-28.) To the contrary, these findings were supported by substantial 
evidence. However, even if these findings were made in error, such findings 
were not necessary to find that Barcella failed to meet his burden to prove that 
his right to testify was violated. Before dismissing Barcella's petition, the district 
court was not required to find that there was "substantial evidence" of Barcella's 
constitutional rights waiver, but only that Barcella failed to meet his burden to 
show his constitutional rights were violated The record reveals that Barcella 
indeed failed to make such a showing. 
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There was no indication during the trial that Barcella was denied his right 
to testify. (See generally #25216 Trial Tr.;4 R., p.280.) Barcella did not assert his 
right to testify in any kind of public way during the trial proceedings. (See 
generally #25216 Trial Tr.; R., p.280.) Subsequently, Barcella was afforded two 
post-conviction evidentiary hearings to address this issue - first pursuant to his 
claim in his initial petition that his trial counsel was ineffective for preventing him 
from testifying, and second pursuant to his claim in his successive petition that 
he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify. (#35502 5/29/07 Tr.; #35502 
5/30/07 Tr.; 8/19/11 Tr.) 
At the first evidentiary hearing, Barcella's trial counsel, John Adams, 
testified that while he took very seriously Barcella's rights, including his right to 
testify, he could not remember whether he informed Barcella of this right or 
prevented him from exercising it. (#35502 5/30/07 Tr., pp.168, L.18 - p.169, 
L.22; p.175, L.1 - p.176, L.1.) Adams is a very experienced defense attorney, 
who had approximately 15 years of experience at the time of the trial. (#35502 
5/30/07 Tr., p.149, Ls.2-22.) Adams was aware of Barcella's right to testify, 
understood the distinction between preventing a client from testifying and 
advising him not to testify, and stated that he could not recall ever preventing any 
client from testifying. (#25502 5/30/07 Tr., p.166, L.20 - p.169, L.2.) Certainly, 
Barcella can make no inference that inexperience or ignorance of the law caused 
4 The trial transcript and the transcripts from the initial post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing were admitted as evidence during the successive post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing. (R., p.311; Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2A, 2B, 2C; 8/19/11 Tr., p.6, 
L.12- p.7, L.17.) 
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his defense counsel to deprive him of his constitutional rights by refusing to allow 
him to testify. 
At the second evidentiary hearing, Tim Gresback, Adams' co-counsel at 
Barcella's murder trial, testified that he could not recall Barcella ever discussing 
with him his desire to testify, despite being involved in the case, and despite 
Barcella's "excellent" ability to verbalize his positions and/or beliefs. (8/19/11 Tr., 
p.48, L.13 - p.62, L.8.) Gresback also could not remember being aware of any 
overt disagreement between Barcella and Adams over the issue of Barcella's 
desire to testify. (8/19/11 Tr., p.58, L.14 - p.60, L.4; p.67, Ls.16-22.) 
Mark Durant, a criminal investigator with the Kootenai County Public 
Defender's Office, who was involved in the Barcella case (8/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.23 
- p.78, L.21 ), testified that the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office had a 
"rule" that "[i]t's up to the defendant to testify" (8/19/11 Tr., p.94, L.21 - p.95, 
L.19). Durant continued that he could remember no occasion in 16 years where 
this rule was deviated from, including the present case. (8/19/11 Tr., p.95, Ls.13-
19.) Finally, Durant explained that, generally, the Kootenai County Public 
Defender's Office explains that rule to clients "numerous times during the pretrial 
meetings," and during the trial itself. (8/19/11 Tr., p.95, L.18- p.96, L.1.) 
Barcella testified that he desired to testify at trial and that he expressed 
that desire to his counsel, but that his counsel did not allow him to testify. 
(5/29/07 Tr., p.122, L.21 -p.123, L.5; 8/19/11 Tr., p.113, Ls.4-13.) Barcella also 
appeared to acknowledge, however, that Adams talked to him about his right to 
testify: 
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Q: Do you have any memory at all of the Judge 
talking to you about your right, your ability to 
waive your Fifth Amendment right to testify? 
[BarcellaJ: I don't know, it's possible. 
Q: You don't know, though? 
[Barcella]: I don't know. I know John told me. I didn't 
know anything about the law back then, I only 
started learning after my appeal. 
(5/29/07 Tr., p.124, Ls.9-16 (emphasis added).) Barcella also testified that 
Adams told him that if he "wanted to give up [his] right to testify," he had to put 
that on the record. (8/19/11 Tr., p.114, Ls.8-10.) These comments create a 
strong inference that Adams and Barcella discussed Barcella's right to testify, 
and that Barcella was thus aware of that right. 
Barcella failed to meet his burden to show that he was unaware of his right 
to testify, that he was his prevented from testifying, or that his constitutional right 
to testify was violated. Barcella never attempted to assert his right to testify 
during the trial proceedings, and Barcella's counsel could not remember if they 
failed to inform Barcella of his rights, or if they prevented him from testifying. The 
district court was not required to grant post-conviction relief based solely on 
Barcella's assertions. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing 
Barcella's petition. 
D. Even If Barcella Had Met His Burden To Show That His Right To Testify 
Was Violated, Any Such Error Was Harmless 
Where a defendant succeeds in meeting his burden to show he or she 
was deprived of the right to testify, the state must convince the reviewing court 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not contribute to the 
defendant's conviction - that it was harmless error. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at_, 
275 P.3d at 4-5 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). 
In this case, the district court concluded that even if Barcella had met his 
burden to show that he deprived his constitutional right to testify, such error was 
harmless. (R., pp.282-283.) However, in making this determination, rather than 
utilizing the Chapman harmless error test, the district court applied, sua sponte, 
the fundamental error and harmless error test announced by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-228, 245 P.3d 961, 971-980 (2010). 
(R., pp.282-283.) The Perry analysis, which applies to appellate review of 
unpreserved errors, requires, as its third prong, an appellant to show that an 
error affected the outcome of his trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 219-228, 245 P. 3d at 
971-980. This test has no application to a district court's analysis of harmless 
error in a constitutional challenge in a post-conviction petition proceeding. 
Therefore, the district court erred in utilizing this standard. However, a review of 
the record reveals that if Barcella was deprived of his right to testify, such 
deprivation was harmless under the Chapman reasonable doubt standard as 
well, and this Court may affirm the district court's decision on this basis. State v. 
Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 728, 905 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Ct. App. 1995) ("If the reason 
expressed by a trial court for its decision is erroneous, the trial court's action will 
nonetheless be upheld on appeal if an alternative legal basis supports it.") 
(citations omitted). 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has already analyzed the harmlessness of 
any error that prevented Barcella from testifying. In Barcella's initial post-
conviction petition proceeding, the district court concluded that even if Barcella's 
counsel was ineffective in preventing him from testifying, any such error was 
harmless pursuant to the Strickland prejudice standard (i.e., the district court 
concluded that Barcella did not show a reasonable probability that, but for any 
error preventing him from testing, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.) (#35502 R., pp.828-829.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court, concluding that Barcella "failed to demonstrate prejudice from any 
prevention by trial counsel of Barcella testifying at trial." Barcella, 148 Idaho at 
477, 224 P.3d at 545. Any deprivation of Barcella's constitutional right to testify 
was similarly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard. 
At his evidentiary hearings, Barcella stated that he wanted to testify at trial 
to deny assertions made by other witnesses, including that he had previously 
shot and killed two other people. (#35502 5/29/07 Tr., p.123, Ls.4-25; 8/19/11 
Tr., p.108, L.19 - p.109, L.22.) Barcella also wanted to testify about the state's 
theory about his motive for the killing, his consumption of alcohol and medication 
around the time of the killing, the events surrounding the killing, and whether or 
not he intended kill Smith. (#35502 5/29/07 Tr., p.119, L.5-p.144, L.16; 8/19/11 
Tr., p.104, Ls.11-17, p.107, Ls.2-8.) 
The district court correctly concluded that this proposed testimony would 
not have affected the outcome of the trial. In affirming Barcella's conviction on 
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direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals characterized the evidence of 
Barcella's guilt as "overwhelming." Barcella, 135 Idaho at 204, 16 P.3d at 301. 
In that opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals also held that the trial witness's 
unsolicited claim that Barcella had admitted shooting two other people, while 
improper, was itself harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: The Court reasoned: 
Although the interjection of the "couple other shootings" 
statement was plainly improper, we conclude that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Lane was the state's twentieth witness. 
Prior to his testimony, the jury had been told by the defense that 
Barcella had a prior felony conviction. The jury heard testimony 
from bartender Smeltzer, bar patron Bakie, and Thrift that Barcella 
had told them he intended to kill Smith. The jury also heard 
testimony from Thrift, Bobo and Lane that Barcella admitted to 
killing Smith. Thrift and Bobo both testified that Barcella owned a 
pulaski. Thrift also testified that he saw Barcella wiping off Smith's 
doorknob with a bandana when Thrift came out of his room the 
night Smith was killed. Bobo testified that the pulaski was missing 
from Barcella's room the next day. A pulaski was recovered from 
under the bed in Smith's room. 
kl at 199, 16 P.3d at 206 (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals concluded 
that "even if Lane's blurt about prior shootings had not been heard by the jury, 
the remaining evidence would have easily led the jury to return a guilty verdict." 
kl Since the testimony about the shootings was itself harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it follows that Barcella's inability to testify and deny the 
shootings was likewise harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, 
Barcella's inability to dispute other specific witness testimony - none of which 
was as potentially prejudicial as the shooting testimony - was also harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of the overwhelming evidence against him. 
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In addition, Barcella's testimony about his intoxicated state the night of the 
murder would have been cumulative with other evidence presented at trial. At 
trial, several witnesses testified that they drank with Barcella at several bars prior 
to the murder. (#25216 Trial Tr. p.560, L.1 - p.572, L.2; p.916, L.22 - p.922, 
L.1.) One stated that Barcella was talking about "getting even" with Smith as he 
became more intoxicated, and another described how he and Barcella continued 
to drink after they left the bars and went to Barcella's apartment immediately prior 
to Smith's murder. (Id.) The latter witness also testified about Barcella's actions 
and statements following the murder, when the two continued to drink beer. 
(#25216 Trial Tr., p.572, L.2 - p.576, L.17.) Additional evidence about Barcella's 
intoxication from his own perspective would not have affected the outcome of the 
trial. 
Finally, Barcella's defense at trial was that the state failed to prove that he 
killed Smith. (R., p.283; #25216 Trial Tr., p.1764, L.23 - p.1789, L.2.) Strategic 
and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation 
with his client. ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, The 
Defense Function 5.2. Barcella's proposed testimony about his excessive 
consumption of alcohol, the events surrounding the killing, and whether or not he 
had the intent to kill Smith, which essentially amounted to an argument that he 
should be convicted of manslaughter rather than first-degree murder, would have 
been directly contrary to the defense's trial strategy and would not have affected 
the outcome of the trial. 
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Even if Barcella were able to meet his burden to show that he was 
deprived his constitutional right to testify, such error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's order 
denying Barcella's successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Barcella's successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 17th day of July 2012. 
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